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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). (R. 410,458).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate this appeal, given that
the appeal filed by Appellants J.J. Hunan, Inc. d/b/a J.J. Hunan Sum Fun Food
("Hunan") and R. Alan Knox ("Knox") (collectively, "Appellants") in this
unlawful detainer action was not filed within ten days of entry of judgment, as
required by under Utah R. App. P. 4(a).

Issues surrounding appellate jurisdiction and timeliness of appeal are not issues that the
district court ever passes upon, and therefore there is no "standard of review." This Court
must determine for itself, essentially de novo, whether it has jurisdiction to entertain this
appeal. This Court instructed the parties to address this issue in their opening briefs.
2.

Whether the district court's legal conclusions 4,7, and 6-8 are correct, in which
the district court concluded that Plaintiff/Appellee Red Cliffs Corner, L.L.C.
("RCC") had the right to terminate the Lease after Hunan failed to pay its rent
timely for three consecutive months.

A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for
correctness, see Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), although
the district court's findings of fact upon which such conclusions are based are reviewed only
after Appellants have marshaled the evidence in support of those findings and, following the
marshaling, demonstrated that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings, id.;
see also Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177. Where "the appellant fails to
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marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the
trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law in the case" "to the facts as found" by the lower court. See
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). RCC does not dispute that Appellants
properly preserved this issue below.
3.

Whether the district court's legal conclusions 10-13 are correct, in which the
district court concluded (i) that Hunan became a tenant at will when it refused
to vacate the premises after receiving RCC's written notice, and (ii) that RCC
complied with the provisions of Utah's tenant-at-will statute.

A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for
correctness, see Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d at 941, although the district court's findings of fact upon
which such conclusions are based are reviewed only after Appellants have marshaled the
evidence in support of those findings and, following the marshaling, demonstrated that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings, id.; see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, f76.
Where "the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case" "to the facts as found"
by the lower court. See Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199. RCC does not dispute that Appellants
properly preserved this issue below.
4.

Whether the district court's legal conclusions 14-15 are correct, in which the
district court concluded that RCC was entitled to damages for unlawful detainer.

A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for
correctness, see Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d at 941, although the district court's findings of fact upon
which such conclusions are based are reviewed only after Appellants have marshaled the
857984v!
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evidence in support of those findings and, following the marshaling, demonstrated that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the Findings, id.; see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, %J6.
Where "the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case'5 "to the facts as found"
by the lower court. See Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199. RCC does not dispute that Appellants
properly preserved this issue below.
5.

Whether the district court's legal conclusions 30-45 are correct, in which the
district court concluded that Appellants had waived their right to claim that RCC
breached the Lease.

A district court's conclusions of law following a bench trial are reviewed for
correctness, see Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d at 941, although the district court's findings of fact upon
which such conclusions are based are reviewed only after Appellants have marshaled the
evidence in support of those findings and, following the marshaling, demonstrated that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings, id.; see also Chen, 2004 UT 82, f76.
Where "the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case" "to the facts as found"
by the lower court. See Saunders, 806 P.2d at 199 (Utah 1991). With regard to waiver, the
Utah Supreme Court has stated that "waiver presents mixed questions of law and fact" and that
"whether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question
which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are
factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations." Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^23.
857984vl
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RCC does not dispute that Appellants properly preserved this issue below.
6.

Whether the district court properly exercised its discretion to deny Appellants'
request to amend their counterclaim.

A district court's denial of a motion to amend pleadings is reviewed only for "abuse of
discretion resulting in prejudice." See Berkshires, LLC v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 536, Ijl 1,127
P.3d 1243. RCC does not dispute that Appellants properly preserved this issue below.
7.

Whether the district court erred in refusing to award RCC its attorneys5 fees as
part of the judgment below.

The district court's decision to grant or deny attorneys' fees when attorneys' fees are
called for in the contract and are mandated by statute is an issue of law which this Court
reviews for correctness. See Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,990-91 (Utah 1988). This issue was preserved in
the district court by motion. (R. 389 (RCC's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact); R. 393
(opposition memorandum); R. 397 (reply memo.); R. 402 (order denying motion)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES
RCC believes that interpretation of the following statutes and rules may be
determinative of portions of this appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802 (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-363): (1) "A tenant holding real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an
unlawful detainer;... (b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite
time with monthly or periodic rent reserved;. . . (ii) in cases of tenancies at
will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a
notice of not less than five calendar days."
•

857984vl

Utah R. App. P. 4(a): " . . . However, when a judgment or order is entered in
a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from."
-4-

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an unlawful detainer case wherein RCC, as the landlord, evicted Hunan from
the leased premises for breach of the lease agreement between the parties. Hunan breached
the lease several times and to such an extent that it gave rise to RCC's right to forfeit
Hunan's leasehold. Because Hunan's leasehold right had been forfeited, Hunan became a
tenant at will. RCC evicted Hunan for unlawful detainer in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§78B-6-802(l)(a)(ii).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2003, RCC began work to build a new building in the available parking lot space
at the Zion Factory Stores in St. George, Utah. This building was intended to house a
Starbucks and some type of restaurant. (R. 341 ^jf 4-7; TT 18:21-19:6). Based on its own
analysis of the local market, RCC determined that the restaurant should carry either Asian
or Mexican food and initially determined it would focus on bringing in a restaurant carrying
Asian food. Id. RCC became aware of an Asian restaurant called J.J. Hunan Sum Fun
Food, which was a d/b/a for Hunan, which was owned in part by Knox. In the late spring of
2003, RCC opened discussions with Hunan regarding Hunan's ability to be the restaurant
next to the Starbucks. (R. 341ffi[6-7; TT 19:7-17).
From approximately June through October 2003, RCC and Hunan negotiated the
terms of a written lease agreement ("Lease"). Hunan requested a number of changes to
RCC's proposed lease agreement, including a request that rent be due on the tenth of the
month instead of the first of the month. (R. 341 U 7 - R. 342 1J 9; TT 20:2 - 21:18). In
addition to negotiating the terms for the lease agreement with Hunan, RCC required Knox,
857984vl
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the principal owner of Hunan, to enter a personal guaranty to guarantee all performance and
indebtedness of Hunan. (R. 342 ^ft} 10-11; TT 21:25-22:5). During the negotiations of the
Lease terms, RCC reminded Hunan that the construction of the building was scheduled to
be ready for Hunan's possession by July 1,2004. (R. 343 Tf 15; TT 23:17-23).
By November 21, 2003, the parties had agreed on all of the final lease terms and
conditions and executed the Lease. (R. 342 ^ 9; TT 21:19-24). The Lease set forth certain
terms for construction for RCC to complete ("Landlord's Work") and improvements Hunan
would make ("Tenant Improvements"). Because construction had to occur quickly, the Lease
required that Hunan deliver two sets of plans showing Tenant Improvements to RCC within
thirty (30) days of signing the Lease or, in other words, by December 21, 2003. (R. 343
^[ 17). RCC needed these plans quickly to review and approve because RCC was
constructing a new building and would need Hunan's plans to determine where to stub
utilities. (R. 343 1f 18 and R. 344 ^ 20). However, Hunan did not provide Tenant
Improvement plans to RCC by the December 21 deadline. In fact, Hunan did not provide its
plans at any time prior to taking physical possession of the space it agreed in the Lease to
occupy ("Premises") in September 2004. (R. 344 f 21; TT 253:13-23). Without Hunan's
plans and specifications, RCC did not know where Hunan intended to place sinks, outlets,
etc. Therefore, RCC stubbed in the plumbing and electrical in a somewhat standard manner.
(R. 344 H 22; TT 41:5-8; 42:20-24; 91:19-25).
RCC hired Watts Construction to construct the entire new building, including all
Landlord's Work. (R. 3441f 23; TT 45:1-6). RCC did observe the progress of construction
and made reports to Hunan that RCC was on target for delivery of possession of the Premises
857984v!

-6-

to Hunan by July 1,2004. (R. 345 U 24; TT 24:2-15). Once Watts Construction confirmed
that its work would be completed by July 1, 2004, RCC prepared a Notice of Tender, which
was required under the terms of the Lease. (R. 345 f 25; TT 25:9-17). The purposes of the
Notice of Tender were (i) to notify Hunan that it could begin Tenant Improvements; (ii) to
trigger Hunan's obligation to commence Tenant Improvements, which Hunan had to
complete within ninety (90) days of the Notice of Tender (R. 345 ^| 26); and (iii) give notice
that rent would commence on the earlier of ninety (90) days or actual opening of Hunan's
business in the Premises. (R. 345ffl[25-26; TT 25:18-25).
The Notice of Tender also triggered a thirty (30) day time period for Hunan to inspect
the Premises prior to taking possession and to give RCC a punchlist of any items that needed
to be completed before Hunan took possession. (R. 345 ^J 27; TT 26:6-12). Hunan sent its
contractor to inspect the Premises during the first week of July 2004. (R. 345 1J 28; TT
234:16-24). Although Hunan had completed its inspection of the Premises, it did not prepare
or provide a punchlist to RCC, nor did Hunan otherwise object to any aspect of Landlord's
Work during the thirty (30) day period provided for in the Lease. (R. 345ffij28-29; R.346
ffi[ 30-32; TT 26:13-23). Hunan did not start Tenant Improvements during July 2004, and
RCC became worried about this lack of activity. By the end of July 2004, RCC contacted
Hunan to make sure Hunan was on schedule to open by the October 1, 2004, deadline.
(R. 346 J 34; TT 26:21-23; 27:2-6).
It was during conversations at the end of July that RCC learned Hunan was building
a second restaurant in a location on the other side of town. (R. 346 f 35; TT 27:2-6). Hunan
still did not construct any Tenant Improvements during August. (R. 346 f 36; R. 347 f 38;
857984vl
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TT 124:4-6). RCC had several conversations and calls with Hunan to monitor the progress
of Tenant Improvements and make sure that Hunan could complete Tenant Improvements
by the deadline. At no time during any of those conversations did Hunan ever raise an issue
regarding the sufficiency of Landlord's work or the inadequacy of the Premises. (R. 347
% 37; TT 27:17-22; 29:2-8). Eventually, right after Labor Day in September 2004, Hunan
began making Tenant Improvements at the Premises. (R. 347 ^ 38; TT 175:4-6).
When Hunan finally took possession of the Premises on September 6, 2004, it
triggered paragraph 3 of the Lease which states that "possession of the Premises shall be
conclusive evidence that Tenant accepts the same and that the Premises are in the condition
called for by this Lease." (R. 347 ffl 38-39; TT 29:18-30:1). Although Hunan had halfheartedly started Tenant Improvements in early September, by September 29, 2004 it was
clear that Hunan was not ready to open its restaurant nor were Tenant Improvements
completed. Therefore, RCC met with Hunan, at which time Hunan acknowledged that it
would not be able to open by the October 1 deadline. (R. 347 ^ 41).
During this September 29 meeting, Hunan raised a few issues regarding Landlord's
Work and the condition of the Premises: holes in some of the drywall; a leak of some kind
from the roof; the need for an exhaust fan area located in the roof; and the HVAC system was
only a seven-ton system when it required a ten-ton system. (R. 347 1J 41; TT 30:6-31:1).
These were the only items Hunan identified. Hunan did not make any complaint or reference
to inadequacies of Landlord's Work regarding the restroom, electrical work, T-bar ceiling,
water heater, plumbing, or flooring, nor did Hunan demand that RCC pay Hunan for any
work performed by Hunan's contractor. (R. 347 U 42 - R. 348 1j 43; TT 31:2-20).
857984vl
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On October 15, 2004, Hunan sent a letter to RCC requesting that the rent
commencement be delayed from October 1 to December 1. This letter raised issues that
Hunan thought were significant and, importantly, was silent as to any problems regarding
restrooms, electrical work, water heater, T-bar ceiling, underground plumbing, or flooring.
(R. 348 H 45-R. 349 % 47; TT 31:21-25; TT 34:5-20).
RCC responded to the letter on October 18, in writing, calling Hunan's attention to
the fact that Hunan was already late in its first payment of rent, as it was due on October 1.
RCC also reminded Hunan of paragraph 5 of the Lease requiring Hunan to pay the rent
beginning on the October 1 commencement date even if Hunan had not completed all Tenant
Improvements. (R. 349 ^ 51). RCC and Hunan continued to negotiate verbally after this
exchange of letters. On October 29, the parties signed an Agreement Regarding Rent
Commencement Date and Landlord Work Under Lease Dated October 22nd, 2003 ("Lease
Modification," copy included behind Tab 1 in the Addendum to this brief) wherein RCC
agreed to waive one month's rent of $9,540.80 and to perform specific additional work at the
Premises, and Hunan agreed (i) to accept the Premises as is; and (ii) that all Landlord's Work
was completed. (R. 349 % 52; R. 373 ] 44; TT 35:4-21; 48:22-49; 50:2).
With the Lease Modification in place, Hunan was obligated to begin paying rent on
November 1, 2004. However, Hunan did not pay rent on November 1, but was late in its
payment. (R. 350 f 57; TT 64:18-65:13). Likewise, Hunan did not make its next rent
payment due on December 1 as called for under the Lease. (R. 351 % 59; TT 65:15-21).
When RCC contacted Hunan about getting the December rent paid, Hunan stated that it did
not have the money, that it did not care about any late fees that would be assessed, and that
857984vl
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it was not going to pay until December 14. (R. 351 ^ 60; TT 65:22-66:4). However, on
December 14 when RCC contacted Hunan about the rent payment, Hunan told RCC's
representative, Becky Pendleton ("Pendleton"), that she would need to make the forty-minute
round-trip drive across town and halfway to Santa Clara to pick it up from Hunan at a
different office. (R. 351 H 61; TT 66:5-14).
Again, Hunan did not pay the rent installment due on January 3, 2005 and when, on
January 7, Pendleton called Hunan about the check, Hunan told her that it would just pay
later. (R. 351 ^ 62; TT 67:18-68:2). Similarly, Hunan did not pay February rent on time
and, when Pendleton was finally able to contact Hunan on February 9, Hunan told her that
it would pay the rent when it had the money. (R. 352 ^ 65-67; TT 69:16-70:6).
In all of these conversations between RCC and Hunan regarding the rent and
obtaining the payments, Hunan never raised any issue regarding the restrooms, electrical
work, water heater, T-bar ceiling, flooring, or plumbing at the Premises, nor did Hunan ever
claim that it was entitled to withhold rent for any reason or contend that Tenant
Improvements costs should offset Hunan's rent obligation. (R. 352 U 69; TT 68:17-69:15;
TT 70:20-71:14).
With Hunan's four initial rent payments all having been made late, RCC became
increasingly concerned and evaluated its rights under the Lease. One portion of Section 29
of the Lease provided that if Hunan failed to make timely rent payments for three consecutive
months, thereafter followed by a fourth late payment, RCC had the right to forfeit Hunan's
leasehold under the Lease. (R. 352 f 72). Accordingly, on February 18, 2005, RCC
exercised this remedy by sending a letter to Hunan giving notice of the forfeiture of the
857984vl
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leasehold, which included notice of Hunan's responsibility to peaceably and quietly surrender
the Premises in a broom-clean condition and in good order and repair. (R. 353 ^j 74; TT
103:8-19). Hunan refused to vacate the Premises. Therefore, on March 4, RCC served
Hunan with a 5-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy at Will. (R. 353 % 75; R. 353 % 76;
TT 104:23-105:7). Hunan refused to vacate the Premises within five days as required by the
5-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy at Will. Therefore, RCC filed the instant unlawful
detainer action. (R. 354 ^ 76).
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
RCC filed its Eviction Complaint and of Personal Guaranty Enforcement
("Complaint") on March 29,2005. (R. 1). Appellants were served the 7-day Summons and
Complaint on April 5, but did not file an Answer until April 18. (R. 16; R. 22). RCC opted
to invoke its statutory right to post a possession bond and obtained an order from the district
court on April 18 setting Plaintiffs possession bond amount at $5,000.00. (R. 21). On April
19, RCC filed its possession bond with the district court in the form of a cash bond and
served a Notice of Plaintiff s Possession Bond on Hunan on April 20. (R. 29). Hunan did
not request a hearing on the possession bond, nor did it post a bond in an amount approved
by the district court within three (3) days as required by the Utah Code. The district court
determined that Hunan failed to comply with the Utah Code regarding the notice of RCC s
payment of possession bond and entered an Order of Restitution, which was served on Hunan
during the first week of May 2005. (R. 41; R. 354 ^ 78). Hunan still refused to vacate the
Premises even after having been served the Order of Restitution and only finally vacated
when the order was enforced by changing the locks. (R. 354 ^ 78).
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On May 23, 2005, RCC's counsel proposed a discovery plan and scheduling order
("Proposed Plan") to Appellants' counsel. (R. 128 U 2). Hunan's counsel would not
participate in discussions about the Proposed Plan during the next ten days. (R. 128 % 3-4).
On June 7, RCC's counsel filed a motion requesting that the district court adopt the Proposed
Plan, which motion was granted. (R. 128-38). By June 15, the district court had entered the
Rule 26 Discovery Plan and Scheduling Order ("Scheduling Order"). (R. 136). The
Scheduling Order set a deadline of July 29, 2005, to amend pleadings. (R. 136 ^ 2).
On August 1, 2005, Appellants filed a Motion to Amend Counterclaim ("Motion to
Amend") with the district court (R. 156), which RCC opposed. (R. 167). Prior to this, RCC
had obtained a release of its possession bond (R. 100), and Appellants had brought a Motion
for Relief From Order Releasing Plaintiffs Possession Bond ("Motion for Relief) (R. 106).
On June 29, Appellants filed a Request to Submit for Decision on the Motion for Relief. (R.
148). On July 22, the district court set the Motion for Relief for hearing on August 18,2005
(R. 154), at which time it denied the Motion for Relief. (R. 174). The district court
conducted a pretrial conference on December 8, 2005, which neither Appellants nor their
counsel bothered to attend. (R. 178).
Despite all of this other activity in the case in July, August, and December, Appellants
did not promptly seek resolution of their Motion to Amend. Rather, on January 17, 2006,
approximately five and a half months after the Motion to Amend was filed, Hunan finally
filed a Request to Submit for Decision. (R. 180). The district court heard oral argument on
the Motion to Amend and ultimately denied the Motion to Amend, entering its Order on
April 5,2006. (R.251). On April 19, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal. (R.298). With
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the appeal, Appellants filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Orders of the
Trial Court ("Petition for Interlocutory Appeal"), which Petition was ultimately denied by
this Court. (R.321).
Because of the pendency of the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, the district court
continued the original May 3 trial date. Ultimately, the trial took place on November 28 and
29,2006. (R. 336-37). On April 10,2007, the district court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Findings"). (R. 340-76). The Findings required a judgment to be
entered against Appellants in favor of RCC for all damages sought by RCC in the total
amount of $113,298.65 and completely dismissed the Counterclaim and all defenses of
Hunan. (R. 359-75).
However, despite a Lease provision entitling RCC to recover its costs and attorneys'
fees, the district court refused to award costs and attorneys' fees to RCC. In response, RCC
filed a Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Rule 52 Motion
to Amend") to allow an award of attorneys' fees. (R. 389). On July 17, 2007, the district
court entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend, a copy of which is included
behind Tab 2 in the Addendum to this brief. (R. 402). Judgment was ultimately entered on
September 11,2007 ("Judgment"). (R. 412). On October 10, thirty days after entry of the
Judgment, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal. (R. 437). Nine days later on October 19,
2007, RCC filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal. (R. 457). At the time Appellants filed their
Notice of Appeal, they had already realized that they may have an appellate timeliness
problem, and on the same day they filed their Notice of Appeal, they also filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal (R. 432), which the district court denied. (R. 466).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case arose as an unlawful detainer action wherein RCC sought to evict Hunan
from the Premises. Appellants contested RCC's right to evict Hunan from the Premises
throughout the proceedings, including at trial. Therefore, Appellants' right to appeal is
governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure as applied to unlawful detainer proceedings.
This includes a requirement that any appeal be filed within ten days after an appealable
judgment is entered. The appealable Judgment in this case was entered September 11,2007,
and Hunan did not file its appeal until October 10, 2007, which is the 30th day after the
Judgment was entered. Hunan's failure to file its notice of appeal within the ten days divests
this Court of jurisdiction, and this appeal should be dismissed on that ground.
Turning to the merits of the case, RCC had the right to forfeit Hunan's leasehold
based on Hunan's consistent failure to pay rent on time. The Lease provides that there are
both material and non-material defaults possible under the Lease. There are different
remedies associated with the different types of default. Although it is possible that a nonmaterial default by late payment of rent may ripen to a material default of the Lease, it is not
mandatory. The Lease also provides that, if Hunan commits the same default for three
consecutive months, RCC is entitled to forfeit Hunan's leasehold on the next default by
Hunan. It does not matter if any of the non-material defaults had become a material default
and were later cured. This is what happened in the instant case, and RCC exercised that right
to forfeit Hunan's leasehold under the Lease. With the Leasehold forfeited, Hunan's
continued occupancy of the Premises became a tenancy at will, which RCC properly
terminated pursuant to Utah Code.
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Although Appellants tried to defend Hunan's position with a Counterclaim alleging
that RCC had first breached the Lease and therefore should not be entitled to terminate the
Lease, the district court properly rej ected Appellants' arguments to that effect and determined
that Appellants had waived all such claims. This waiver was an express waiver, as evidenced
by the Lease Modification. In addition to that express waiver, the district court found
numerous facts to support an implied waiver as well. The district court properly concluded
that the express waiver, as well as the implied waiver, established that Appellants did not
have a claim for offset, and therefore dismissed Appellants' Counterclaim in full.
Appellants had tried to amend their Counterclaim prior to trial. However, Appellants
did not submit a memorandum giving any appropriate factual or legal reason for the district
court to grant their motion. The district court denied the Motion to Amend based on this
failure to provide any rational reason in law or fact, along with several other reasons
enumerated by the district court in its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend.
Appellants have latched onto one of those enumerated reasons as though that is the whole
reason the district court denied the Motion to Amend, and focus their argument on that one
reason while ignoring the other reasons. The one reason was whether a request to submit for
decision needs to be filed at any particular time after a motion has been filed. However,
since the district court entered its decision based on multiple grounds and conclusions, its
decision can easily be upheld on those other grounds.
Finally, the district court, in making its award to RCC, refused to award RCC its
attorneys' fees incurred in enforcing the Lease. This ruling of the district court goes contrary
to the Lease provision which allows recovery of attorneys' fees, as well as the statutory
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provision which requires that the court shall award attorneys' fees when they are provided
for by the underlying contract. The district court relied on Utah case law that allows a court,
in extraordinary circumstances, to refuse to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party.
However, the extraordinary circumstances that might give rise to such an anomaly are not
present in this case, and the district court should be reversed in this conclusion.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS APPEAL IS UNTIMELY BECAUSE IT IS AN APPEAL IN AN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION, AND APPELLANTS DID NOT FILE
THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHIN TEN DAYS
First, this appeal is untimely, because it is an appeal in an unlawful detainer action,

and the Rules of Appellate Procedure require that such appeals be filed within ten days after
entry ofjudgment. Despite Appellants' creative arguments to the contrary, this appeal is in
fact an appeal in an unlawful detainer action. It is undisputed that Appellants did not file this
appeal within ten days after entry ofjudgment. Accordingly, this Court should conclude that
it lacks jurisdiction, and should dismiss this appeal, because it was filed too late.
A.

A Notice of Appeal from an Unlawful Detainer Complaint Must Be Filed
Within Ten Days of the Entry of the Final Judgment or Order

Utah R. App. P. 4(a) states that "when a judgment or order is entered in a[n] . . .
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within [ten] days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from." This Court has recently held that this rule means what it says:
This matter originated as a complaint for unlawful detainer. Because this was
initiated as an unlawful detainer action, the Gerbers were required to file their
notice of appeal within ten days after the entry ofjudgment. They failed to do
so, making their appeal untimely and depriving this court of jurisdiction.
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See Noorlander v. Gerber, 2007 UT App 346, %3; Preferred Property MgmL v. Paulman,
2008 UT App 252; see also Vickery v. Kaiser, 556 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976) (stating that "this
action is clearly one brought under the forcible entry statute" and was therefore subject to a
ten-day appeal deadline).
Appellants argued to the district court that shortening the time for appeal to ten days
was not fair or consistent with the other rules of court. (R. 434-35). This claim, even if true,
does not help Appellants because a rule is a rule, and it must be enforced. As noted above,
this Court has continually enforced the ten-day appeal deadline in unlawful detainer cases,
and there does not seem to be any controversy about it. In any event, however, the ten-day
appeal deadline in unlawful detainer cases does in fact have sound policy justification, as it
is necessary to promote the policy of "speedy determination" of unlawful detainer actions.
See Vickery, 556 P.2d at 502-03. "Although such deadlines are concededly arbitrary, they
must be adhered to in order to prevent cases from continually lingering and to ensure finality
in the system." Serratov. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,1(11,13P.3d616. The tenday requirement for a notice of appeal in an unlawful detainer claim is clear and robust, and
there is no reason why this Court should abandon its clear precedent.
B.

This Case Was Filed as an Unlawful Detainer Action and Always
Remained an Unlawful Detainer Action, and Therefore This Appeal Is
Untimely

Before the district court, in an ex parte filing made the same day they filed their notice
of appeal, Appellants next argued that the ten-day appeal deadline did not apply because,
they asserted, this case was not an unlawful detainer case. (R. 432). Nothing could be
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further from reality. One of the elements to an unlawful detainer action is the determination
of the right to possession of the leased property. This case originated as an unlawful detainer
action and always remained an unlawful detainer action. All of the issues in the case were
closely related to—indeed, stemmed from—the unlawful detainer claim. The Complaint was
filed to evict Hunan, have the premises restored to RCC, and obtain a judgment for the
damages as allowed pursuant to the unlawful detainer statute. Appellants, in a pretrial
motion brought after possession had been restored to RCC, argued to the district court that
Hunan's "right to possession has not yet been litigated." (R. 105). This is a stereotypical
unlawful detainer action.
Appellants are not the first litigants in an unlawful detainer case to belatedly realize
that they have missed the appeal deadline. In such cases, the typical reaction appears to be
to try to hastily characterize the case as something other than an unlawful detainer action, in
hopes that the thirty-day (rather than the ten-day) appeal deadline will apply. Over the years,
some litigants have succeeded with this strategy, while others have failed. The ones who
succeed are able to show that the lawsuit included separate claims for equitable or
declaratory relief, such that the lawsuit could not fairly be characterized as an unlawful
detainer action. Appellants cannot make this showing here.
In their brief, Appellants assert that "the thirty day time limit applies even where a
complaint alleges unlawful detainer if the case involves additional claims," see Aplt. Br., at
21, but the only "additional claims" they can point to are their counterclaim "against RCC
for breach of the Lease" and RCC's separate claim "for breach of the Lease against Knox
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as a personal guarantor," id. at 22 (emphasis added). Appellants do not, and cannot, point
to any other additional claims.
Utah appellate courts have long made clear that, where the only additional claim in
an unlawful detainer action was for breach of the lease, that is insufficient to lift the case out
of the ten-day appellate deadline, because all unlawful detainer actions, at some level,
involve issues relating to whether the lease was breached. See Brandley v. Lewis, 92 P.2d
338 (Utah 1939). In order to remove the case from the "unlawful detainer" category and thus
from the ten-day deadline, truly separate additional claims must be present, such as, for
instance, equitable claims or claims for declaratory relief. See Gordon Case & Co, v. West,
2005 UT App 304,ffi|7-l1, 117 P.3d 1070; Fashions Four Corp. v. Fashion Place Assoc,
681 P.2d 830, 831 (Utah 1984); Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply, 188 P. 1117 (Utah
1920). Appellants do not—and cannot—argue that there were any such claims present here.
Because Appellants can only point to claims relating to breach of the Lease as the
"additional claims," they run headlong into Brandley, the case most factually similar to this
one. In Brandley, the plaintiff brought a "straight typical unlawful detainer complaint."
Brandley, 92 P.2d at 339. The defendant mounted a defense based on certain provisions of
the lease, which she claimed demonstrated that her detainer of the premises was not
unlawful. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, but not
within ten days. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, and the defendant (like Hunan here)
claimed that the case was not an unlawful detainer case, but rather was a case "for the
construction of a lease." Id.
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The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the case was in fact an
unlawful detainer action that needed to be appealed, if at all, within ten days. The Court
rejected the defendant's efforts to portray the case as one regarding lease construction:
Since unlawful detainer is an action to oust a tenant whose lease has expired
or been terminated, it follows that plaintiff must show that defendant's lease
has terminated. In this cause, that termination depended upon the terms of the
contract of lease
To determine therefore whether defendant was in
unlawful detainer the court must determine the meaning and effect of the
[lease], but that does not change the action from one in unlawful detainer.
It is merely deciding a question the decision of which is necessary in making
a determination as to whether defendant is in unlawful detainer.
Id. at 339-40 (emphasis added).
The Brandley Court, in reaching its decision, distinguished Ottenheimer, noting that
the situation might have been different had "defendant in her pleadings raised some issue in
equity," but that absent such issues, the case was an unlawful detainer action that must be
appealed, if at all, within ten days. Id. at 340. By contrast, in Ottenheimer, the plaintiff
sought not only to evict the defendant, but to quiet title in a parcel abutting the leased
premises as well. The Ottenheimer court noted that the plaintiff, who sought to enforce the
ten-day appeal requirement, had also sought to enforce the equitable aspect quiet title of its
claim throughout the proceedings. 188 P. at 1118. Under these circumstances, the court
concluded that the thirty-day, rather than the ten-day, appeal period should apply, because
not all of the issues in the case stemmed from the unlawful detainer action. Id.; see also
Fashions Four, 681 P.2d at 831 (stating "that the hybrid nature of plaintiffs action,
containing additional declaratory and equitable causes, and of the defendant's counterclaim
with similar causes, prevents [the ten-day period] from controlling the time for appeal").
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Even more recently, this Court has affirmed the principles announced in Brandley and
Ottenheimer. In Gordon Case, the plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer suit, and the defendant
successfully moved to dismiss the case. The plaintiff appealed, but waited until the thirtieth
day following entry ofjudgment to do so. This Court, on appeal, after analyzing the relevant
rules and statutes, concluded "that all matters stemming from an unlawful detainer action,
including alleged procedural irregularities committed during the action, are subject to the tenday period." See Gordon Case, 2005 UT App 304, ^[11 (emphasis added).
In this case, there is a reason why Appellants are unable to point to additional and
separate equitable or declaratory claims, as were present in Ottenheimer: there aren't any.
According to Utah law, a successful unlawful detainer action not only results in the
restitution of the premises, but includes damages for the unlawful detainer, waste to the
premises, the amount of rent due, and attorney's fees if provided for in the lease. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-811. It also allows for certain damages to be trebled. All of the issues
in this case were expressly mentioned in this statute, or directly "stemmed" from it.
RCC's complaint contained only two causes of action, one for unlawful detainer
action and one for enforcement of the personal guaranty. Appellants' Counterclaim was
nothing more than an attempt to offset damages by amounts they claimed Hunan was owed
under the Lease, as well as an attempt to argue that Hunan was not in unlawful detainer under
the terms of the Lease. The damages sought by RCC were simply those related to the amount
of rent due and for the period of unlawful detainer as allowed under the statute. The
Counterclaim was an argument to have that amount reduced. The personal guaranty, which
was an integral requirement for RCC to enter the Lease, simply assigns responsibility for
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who will be responsible for payment of the damages. Finally, although the Premises had
been restored to RCC through the possession bond procedure, Appellants continued to argue
at trial that RCC was not entitled to possession. In sum, this case is indistinguishable from
Brandley—this case was filed as an unlawful detainer case, and Appellants defended the
matter by trying to show that RCC itself had breached the Lease and was, thereofore, not
entitled to recover the Premises.
RCC's point is further driven home by examination of Appellants' docketing
statement, where they set forth 18 issues for appeal. Six of those issues—items (e), (f), (g),
(h), (k), and (o)—involve their argument against unlawful detainer and RCC's right to
possession. Nine of the issues—items (a), (b), (c), (d), (i), (j), (1), (n), and (r)—involve its
claim to offset the unlawful detainer damages awarded to RCC. Appellants raised one issue
(m) regarding the personal guaranty, and two issues, (p) and (q), regarding pre- and postjudgment interest.
The trial was not just about the amount of money damages to be awarded to RCC.
The trial was about RCC's right to have possession restored to it under the unlawful detainer
statute. The issues tried all arose from the unlawful detainer action. Therefore, the ten-day
requirement for filing the notice of appeal controls. Appellants filed its notice of appeal well
past the ten days required and the district court denied its motion for an extension of time to
file. Therefore, the appeal is untimely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the matter and
should dismiss the appeal. Likewise, RCC's cross-appeal is only timely if Appellants' appeal
is timely. Therefore, the cross-appeal should also be dismissed.
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II.

RCC PROPERLY TERMINATED THE LEASE WHEN HUNAN FAILED TO
PAY ITS RENT TIMELY FOR FOUR CONSECUTIVE MONTHS
In their initial brief, Appellants admit that for four consecutive months—November

2004 through February 2005—Hunan paid its rent late. Under the plain language of the
Lease, RCC could terminate Hunan's tenancy after the fourth late rent payment.
Accordingly, RCC was within its rights to terminate Hunan's leasehold.
A*

The Lease Permitted RCC to Terminate Hunan's Tenancy Upon One
Material Default and Failure to Cure, or Upon Three Non-Material
Defaults Followed By One Additonal Non-Material Default

The Lease provides two separate methods by which Hunan's late payment of rent
could result in the termination of its tenancy.
First, Hunan could fail to make a rental payment when due and further fail to pay the
rent within the ten days following a notice of default from RCC. The Lease calls this failure
a "material default and breach":
Tenant shall be in material default and breach under this Lease if (i) Tenant
shall default in the payment as and when due of any Minimum Rent,
Additional Rent or any other amount required to be paid by Tenant hereunder,
and such default shall continue for a period often (10) days after written notice
thereof from Landlord.
See Lease (attached to Aplt. Br. as Tab 1), % 29. As soon as Hunan committed a material
default and breach, RCC had the right to terminate Hunan's leasehold:
[TJhen Landlord shall have, in addition to any other remedies at law, or in
equity, without the requirement of any further notice to Tenant, the notice
provided by this Section 29, being intended to be in addition to any such
requirements, and without barring later election of any other other remedy, any
one or more of the following remedies at Landlord's election . . .
* * *
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A. By written notice to Tenant, Landlord may terminate this Lease and
Tenant's right to possession, reenter the Premises in the manner allowed by
law and repossess the Premises, in which event this Lease shall terminate.
Id. RCC hereafter refers to this portion of Section 29 as the "Single Material Default
Provision."
Second, the Lease permits RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy once Hunan defaults
in its obligation to pay rent for three consecutive months, then followed by late payment in
one additional month:
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, if Tenant shall default in the
payment of any Rent, or any sum of money due to be paid by Tenant
hereunder, or in the timely reporting of Gross Sales as required by Section 5
of the Lease,... then notwithstanding that such default shall have been cured
within the period after notice as provided by this Section 29, any further or
additional default, whether of a similar or dissimilar nature, shall be deemed
to be deliberate and Landlord need not afford Tenant an opportunity to cure
any further or additional default as provided by this Section 29, but shall have
the right, at Landlord's option in addition to, and not in limitation of, any other
right or remedy available to Landlord at law, in equity, or hereunder, to
terminate this Lease giving Tenant a three (3) day written notice of
cancellation.
Id, RCC hereafter refers to this provision as the "Cumulative Default Provision."
B.

Utah Law Enforces Lease Default Provisions as Written

Leases are contracts and interpreted by the "well-settled rules of contract
interpretation." McEwan v. Mountain Land Support Corp,, 2005 UT App 240, f 16,116 P.3d
955. Contract interpretation "begins with an examination of the contract itself." Trolley
Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
When "[t]he language of the relevant contracts between [the parties] establishing the
lease appears to be complete and unambiguous, [courts] apply the 'four comers5 rule of
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contract analysis, looking no further than the language of the lease." Oakwood Vill LLC v.
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,1(17, 104 P.3d 1226; see also Baxter v. Saunders Outdoor
Adver,, Inc., 2007 UT App 340, ^[11,171 P.3d 469 ("If the language within the four corners
of the contract is unambiguous . . . [we] determine [ ] the parties' intentions from the plain
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law.") (alterations in original); Trolley
Square, 886 P.2d, at 63 ("The initial question of whether the lease agreement is ambiguous
is a question of law.") (citations omitted). Accordingly, surrounding circumstances or parol
evidence may not be used "to create ambiguity where the language of the contract would not
otherwise permit." Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^27, — P.3d —.
Daines is the Utah Supreme Court's most recent decision dealing with principles of
contract interpretation. There, that court noted that "a finding of ambiguity will prove to be
the exception and not the rule." Daines, 2008 UT 51, at f30 n. 5. A lease need not be "a
model of clarity" to be deemed unambiguous. See, e.g., McEwan, 2005 UT App, at ^J25
("While these factors suggest that the Lease is not a model of clarity, they do not make it
ambiguous."); Trolley Square, 886 P.2d, at 65 ("While the lease agreement is not a model
of clarity, we find the lease term is defined sufficiently within the four corners of the
document

"). Lease provisions are ambiguous only if there is more than one reasonable

interpretation of the provision. See Baxter, 2007 UT App, at f 11 ("A lease agreement, like
any contract, is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because
of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.").
In determining whether ambiguities exist, courts "consider each contract provision
. . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none."
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Kenney v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209,1J42,186 P.3d 989 (omission in original). Also, "a party
cannot make a successful claim of ambiguity based on usage of a term that is not reasonable
or is the product of 'forced or strained construction.'" Daines, 2008 UT, at ^|30 n.5.
The Lease in this case is not ambiguous, and the district court correctly so concluded.
See District Court Legal Conclusion 4 (stating that the "Lease between the parties, as
modified by the Lease Modification, is . . . unambiguous, and is binding upon the parties").
These provisions are therefore enforceable and binding on Appellants.
C.

After Hunan's Four Late Payments, RCC Properly Terminated Hunan's
Tenancy Pursuant to the Cumulative Default Provision

The Lease creates two distinct categories of default: (1) "material breach and
default" and (2) a default that is non-material. The former—contained in the Single
Material Default Provision—permits RCC to terminate Hunan's leasehold as soon as Hunan
(i) fails to make a single payment of Rent when due, and (ii) further fails to make that
payment within 10 days ("Cure Period") following RCC's written notice to Hunan of
Hunan's failure ("Default Notice").
However, RCC terminated Hunan's tenancy pursuant to the Cumulative Default
Provision. The Single Material Default Provision, the concept of "material default," the
Cure Period and the Default Notice have nothing to do with RCC's termination of Hunan's
tenancy or with the issues on appeal. Indeed, except to say there is no Cure Period, the
Cumulative Default Provision does not even use the word "cure."
The Cumulative Default Provision gives RCC the right to terminate Hunan's
leasehold as soon as Hunan (1) has simply defaulted "for three (3) consecutive months" in
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the payment of rent, and (2) thereafter makes just one more "further or additional default"
in its timely payment of rent. After Hunan has committed three consecutive defaults by
paying rent late, RCC "need not afford [Hunan] an opportunity to cure [the fourth] further
or additional default..." None of this requires a material default.
In their initial brief, Appellants accept the plain language of the Cumulative Default
Provision providing that RCC did not have to give Hunan either a Default Notice or a Cure
Period upon Hunan's fourth failure to pay rent after Hunan's three consecutive failures.
However, Appellants argue that the Cumulative Default Provision required RCC to give
Hunan both a Default Notice and a Cure Period for each of the three consecutive defaults
that Hunan committed in November and December 2004 and in January 2005. See Aplt. Br.,
at 13, 18,32-33.
Appellants' argument requires this Court to conflate the language and purpose of the
Single Material Default Provision with the language and purpose of the Cumulative Default
Provision. For the following reasons, the Court should decline Appellants' invitation to
create a hybrid default provision that is not contained in the Lease.
First, a Default Notice has no independent significance under the Lease. Nothing in
either provision requires RCC to send out any Default Notices. The Single Material Default
Provision simply requires that, before RCC can terminate Hunan's tenancy for missing a
single payment (which the Single Material Default Provision refers to as a "material default
and breach"), RCC must provide Hunan with a Default Notice and afford Hunan the Cure
Period before Hunan's single missed payment can ripen from a non-material default into a
"material default and breach," which permits RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy. The fact
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that RCC might have sent out one or more Default Notices in connection with its rights
under the Single Material Default Provision does not translate to a requirement that RCC
must have sent Hunan three Default Notices as a condition precedent to RCC's ability to
terminate Hunan's tenancy under the Cumulative Default Provision.
Second, for the same reasons, the Single Material Default Provision concept of a
single "material default and breach" sufficient to terminate Hunan's tenancy has nothing to
do with the concept of repetitive missed payments that give rise to RCC's rights under the
Cumulative Default Provision.
Third, the policies of the two provisions are different. Under the Single Material
Default Provision a single failure to cure a missed rental payment is sufficient grounds for
RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy. By contrast, the Cumulative Default Provision focuses
on a pattern of late payments that are collectively (not individually) sufficient to justify
RCC's termination of Hunan's leasehold. The Cumulative Default Provision emphasizes
that a series of non-material defaults in paying Rent, even if each is cured, is "deemed to be
deliberate." Appellants' argument relies on certain language in the Cumulative Default
Provision ("notwithstanding that [the three consecutive] default shall have been cured within
the period after notice as provided by this Section 29 . . . " ) . The phrase "notwithstanding
that" is merely a fancy way of saying "although." See Webster's New International
Dictionary oj the English Language (2d ed., unabridged, 1960), at 1670. This provision
merely makes clear (and Appellants do not dispute) that once Hunan has failed to pay rent
on time for three consecutive months, RCC is not required to give Hunan either a Default
Notice or Cure Period upon Hunan's fourth late payment of Rent, even though RCC may
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have given Hunan one or more Default Notices and Cure Periods in connection with the
three consecutive late Rent payments. Nothing in the language requires RCC to have sent
Hunan three Default Notices and afforded Hunan three Cure Periods before RCC could take
advantage of the Cumulative Default Provision.
Fourth, by definition, the Cumulative Default Provision does not need to be based on
a pattern of late cures (beyond the ten days allowed by the Cure Period), because under the
Single Material Default Provision, a single non-material default that Hunan fails to cure
within the Cure Period automatically ripens into a "material breach and default." There need
never be a second material breach and default, because one was sufficient for RCC to
terminate Hunan's tenancy.
Fifth, Appellants admit that, although Hunan made untimely Rent payments for
November and December 2004 and January 2005, Hunan did pay the rent and late fees due
for those months. See Aplt. Br., at 11, 32. Because Hunan had paid the rent and late fees,
there simply was no reason for RCC to send Hunan either a Default Notice or afford Hunan
a Cure Period. They would have been meaningless gestures, and the law does not require
a futile or vain act, and excuses performance of any act that would have been "an idle
ceremony and of no avail." See Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT App 243,1J15, 139 P.3d 271.
For all these reasons, there was no reason for RCC to have sent Hunan Default
Notices or to have afforded Hunan Cure Periods for November and December 2004 and
January 2005. This failure is the only grounds on which Appellants challenge RCC's right
to terminate Hunan's tenancy, and the Court should affirm the district court's Conclusions
of Law numbers 4,7 [sic] (on page 22, beginning "Paragraph 6 of the Lease ...") and 6-8.
fi<-7Qfiil«*t
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III.

DUE TO HUNAN'S DELIBERATE PATTERN OF RENT PAYMENT
DEFAULTS AND RCC'S TERMINATION OF THE LEASE, HUNAN WAS IN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER, AND THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE AND PROPERLY
ASSESSED DAMAGES
The Cumulative Default Provision permits RCC to
terminate this Lease giving Tenant a three (3) day written notice of cancellation.
Upon the expiration of said three (3) days, this Lease shall terminate without in
any way releasing Tenant from Tenant's liability hereunder with regard to a
termination of this Lease in the event of a default by Tenant under this Lease.

See Lease (attached to Aplt. Br. as Tab 1), Tj 29. Accordingly, once Hunan failed to pay its
February 2005 rent on the February 1 due date, it was subject to the Cumulative Default
Provision. RCC, in compliance with the Cumulative Default Provision, issued its Notice of
Cancellation of Lease ("Cancellation Notice") on February 18, 2005. (R. 7-11).
A.

Hunan Was in Unlawful Detainer

Hunan did not vacate the Premises within three days required by the Cumulative
Default Provision of the Lease and the Cancellation Notice. On the fourth day, Hunan
accordingly became a tenant at will. See District Court's Conclusion No. 11 (R. 362-63).
Appellants do not challenge that conclusion. They just ignore it, as well as the portion
of Utah's unlawful detainer statute specifically dealing with tenants at will. The statutory
provision applicable to tenants at will, provides as follows:
(1)

A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an
unlawful detainer:
* * *

(b)
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(ii)

in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice
of not less than five days;.. .

See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802(l)(b)(ii) (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-363(l)(b)(ii)) ("subsection (b)(ii)"). Appellants ignore this statute, and instead make two
arguments why Hunan was not in unlawful detainer.
First, Appellants again argue that RCC had to give Hunan Default Notices and Cure
Periods for each of the three consecutive defaults that Hunan committed in November and
December 2004 and in January 2005. See Aplt. Br., at 2,36. RCC has already explained in
Part II.C, supra, why this is not the case.
Second, Appellants argue that (i) Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-802(l)(c) (the former
section 78-36-3(1 )(c) ("subsection (l)(c)")) is the unlawful detainer statute applicable to
Hunan, (ii) this statute required RCC to give Hunan the alternative of either paying rent or
surrendering the Premises, and (iii) because the Cancellation Notice failed to give Hunan that
choice, Hunan was not in unlawful detainer.
In making this argument, Appellants ignore the fact that the default that terminated
Hunan's tenancy was not Hunan's non-payment of the February 2005 rent installment. RCC
terminated Hunan's tenancy because of a pattern of four late Rent payments that the
Cumulative Default Provision "deemed to be deliberate."
Because (i) RCC permissibly issued the Cancellation Notice based on Hunan's pattern
of deliberate delay in paying Rent, and not on a missed Rent payment, and (ii) the Lease
expressly authorized RCC to terminate Hunan's tenancy based on Hunan's pattern of late
payment, subsection (l)(c) is not relevant to this dispute. Instead, subsection (b)(ii), dealing
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with tenants at will, is the relevant statute. Because RCC complied with the requirements
of subsection (b)(ii), this Court should affirm the district court's Conclusions of Law
numbers 10 through 13.
B.

The District Court Properly Assessed Unlawful Detainer Damages

In their challenge to unlawful detainer damages, Appellants merely repeat arguments
they make elsewhere in their initial brief. Accordingly, RCC incorporates its arguments
made elsewhere in this brief responding to Appellants' arguments. For those reasons, this
Court should affirm the district court's Conclusions of Law numbers 14-15.
C.

The Issue Regarding an Early Refund of Possession Bond Is Moot

Next, Appellants ask this Court to reverse the district court's order refunding RCC's
possession bond. Appellants assert that the key purpose of the possession bond filed by RCC
is to have the bond money available to reimburse Hunan if the court were to rule in
Appellants' favor. Appellants do not provide any case law to support their position that the
district court committed reversible error in refunding the possession bond paid by RCC.
Regardless of Appellants' failure to brief this issue, because the purpose as stated by
Appellants is only effective if Appellants were to have obtained a ruling in their favor, the
issue is moot as the trial court did not rule in Appellants' favor. Therefore, Appellants have
not been harmed by the trial court's ruling.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT APPELLANTS
WAIVED THEIR CLAIM THAT RCC BREACHED THE LEASE
Next, the district court properly concluded that Appellants waived their claim that RCC

breached the Lease. Hunan failed to act in a timely manner throughout construction of the
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Premises and waived several issues that it later tried to raise as a breach of contract by RCC.
The district court has broad discretion in determining whether the testimony and evidence
at trial support its Findings that Appellants waived their claims. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82 T|23, 100 P.3d 1177. In order to challenge the district court's Findings, Appellants
must marshal all of the evidence in support of the Findings. Id. at If 76. Appellants have not
even attempted to marshal the evidence, and have not argued that they have met the
marshaling requirement. Therefore, this Court must accept all of the Findings as valid. Id.
a t l 19-20, 80.
Appellants' statement of facts in their brief does not refer to the Findings; rather, it
relies on various portions of Knox's own trial testimony to the exclusion of the Findings. In
doing this, Appellants' simply re-argue their case presented to the district court, which is not
permitted. Id. at 1J 77. Therefore, Appellants' references to the trial transcript to the
exclusion of the Findings are irrelevant and should be rejected.
The district court set out very detailed conclusions of law detailing how it concluded,
based on the evidence, that Appellants waived their rights with knowledge of what they were
waiving. (R. 368 ^| 30-R. 373 f 45). In order for Appellants to prevail on appeal, this Court
must review the actual conclusions of law and determine that in each situation enumerated
by the district court, that it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that, on these facts, there
was a waiver. See Chen, 2004 UT 82, f42. Unless Appellants actually challenge the district
court's findings, this Court can only refer to the district court's Findings in performing this
evaluation, and not the tidbits of testimony referenced by Appellants in their brief.
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In order to determine that Appellants waived their claims and rights, the district court
had to apply a three-prong test: (1) whether Appellants had an existing right, benefit or
advantage; (2) whether Appellants had knowledge of its existence; and (3) whether
Appellants intended to relinquish the right. See Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d
7,9 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). If a waiver is found, the waiving party is precluded from asserting
an action or defense based upon the waived right or benefit. See, e.g., Bakowski v. Mountain
States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, ffi[21-32,40,52 P.3d 1179 (holding that party waived its right
to subrogation and upholding dismissal of party's subrogation claim); Cont'l Ins. Co. v.
Kingston, 2005 UT App 233,1[9,114 P.3d 1158 ("Once a party intentionally relinquishes the
right to rescind, it is thereafter prohibited from asserting that right.").
The first element of waiver—an existing right, benefit or advantage—may be found
in a contract. A contract may grant a promisor existing contractual rights, benefits, or
advantages, such as the right to cancel a contract if certain conditions are not met. See, e.g.,
Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) (upholding
contract in which party retained right to terminate contract if value of property would not
justify further contract performance).

The second element—knowledge of a right's

existence—may be inferred from a party's signature on a contract: "[a] party may not sign
a contract and thereafter assert ignorance or failure to read the contract as a defense." John
CallEngg, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205,1208 (Utah 1987). Appellants do not
challenge the district court's conclusion that the first two prongs of the test are met.
Relinquishment of a contractual right, the final element of waiver, must be distinctly
made and may be express or implied. Soter 's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857
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P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). To find relinquishment, "a fact finder need only determine
whether the totality of the circumstances 'warrants the inference of relinquishment/" IHC
Health Servs., Inc. v. D &KMgmL, Inc., 2003 UT 5, f7, 73 P.3d 320 (quoting Soter's9 857
P.2d at 942). In the case at hand, there was an express waiver. Hunan signed the Lease
Modification, which distinctly stated that all Landlord's Work was completed and that Hunan
was accepting the Premises as is. See Lease Modification (behind Tab 1, attached hereto).
This is a distinct express waiver of the claim that Landlord's Work was not yet complete.
The Lease defines Landlord's Work as both performing certain construction and paying for
it. The statement in the Lease Modification that the Landlord's Work is complete is a
statement that it is both constructed and paid for. Based on that statement, RCC would have
no obligation to construct or pay for any item enumerated as Landlord's Work in the Lease
other than specific items in the Lease Modification.
In addition to this express waiver, the district court, in paragraph 39 of its conclusions
of law, set out the framework for its conclusions that Appellants waived their various
contract rights based on both express and implied waiver, stating as follows:
39.
In the case at hand, Tenant had its specific rights and time frames
outlined within the Lease regarding the acceptance or rejection of Landlord's
Work, as well as obligations to provide plans and specifications to Landlord to
guide that work:
A.
The Lease states in Exhibit "C," subparagraph 1 (batestamped page RCC-00051), "Tenant shall deliver two sets of plans to
Landlord within thirty (30) days of date of Lease execution and Landlord
shall have ten (10) days to review and approve said plans and
specifications." Paragraph 5 of the Lease (bate-stamped page RCC000011) states "Prior to the commencement of Tenant's Work or any
alterations or additions in, or to the Premises, Tenant shall deliver to
Landlord, for its written approval, all drawings, plans and specifications
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for Tenant's Work or any addition or alteration (collectively referred to
as "Plans"), which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld or unduly
delayed." Hunan did not submit its plans to RCC for approval. It is thus
barred from any claim of damages that would arise from the contention
that something was not located in the proper place at the Premises.
B.
Under paragraph 5 of the Lease, "Tenant shall have the
right during the thirty (30) day period immediately following Notice of
Tender to present to Landlord a reasonable punch list of items relating to
structural items or items described in Exhibit U C" for Landlord to repair
at Landlord's reasonable discretion." Hunan did not provide a punchlist,
therefore it waived its right to later claim a problem with [the] state of the
Landlord's Work now.
C.
Paragraph 3 of the Lease states "Tenant's taking physical
possession of the Premises shall be conclusive evidence that Tenant
accepts the same and that the Premises are in the condition called for by
this Lease." Hunan had the option to not take possession until it was
satisfied with the condition of the Premises. Likewise, RCC had the right
to rely on this provision that RCC's work was complete once Hunan took
possession and began doing its own work at the Premises. RCC had a
contractual relationship with Watts Construction and could require them
to come in and complete any work that was overlooked but should have
been done under the terms of the contract. By taking possession, Hunan
waived any and all claims that Landlord's Work was incomplete.
D.
In addition, the parties entered the Lease Modification on
October 29,2004, bate-stamped RCC-000076. Even if Hunan's actions
up to this point had not been enough to establish that Hunan was waiving
certainrightsunder the Lease, Hunan affirmatively accepted the Premises
as-is and indicated that all of Landlord's work was complete, as set forth
in the Lease Modification, and Hunan received consideration in the form
of RCC's waiver of one months rent. Hunan's claim that RCC still
needed to pay for work Mr. Funk had completed because the Lease
Modification states that Hunan waives claims for "further" Landlord's
Work is not persuasive. First, it is inconsistent with the statement that
Hunan accepts the Premises as-is. Second, the Lease describes as
Landlord's Work both the payment and the performance of the items set
forth in Exhibit "C" to the Lease. No further Landlord's Work, therefore,
means no further payment or performance for the items in Exhibit "C".
Therefore, Hunan waived any claim for further payment from RCC other
than what was set forth in the Lease Modification.
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R. 370-372.
The district court then specifically stated whatrightsand claims Hunan waived, stating:
40.
By Hunan's failure to submit plans and specifications to RCC as
required under the Lease, Hunan waived any claim that RCC failed to provide
the work set forth in Exhibit "C" to the Lease that could have been prevented
had Hunan complied with the Lease. Furthermore, RCC gave Hunan the Notice
of Tender and Hunan then had then thirty days to inspect the Premises and raise
any issue regarding Landlord's Work. Hunan inspected the Premises but did not
raise any objections or give notice of any concerns about the condition of the
Premises or Landlord's Work.
41.
By itss [sic] failure to raise any objections or provide a punchlist,
Hunan waived its claim that RCC did not fully comply with its obligations under
the Lease. Any changes that Hunan made after it had accepted the Landlord's
Work and taken possession of the Premises were undertaken at Hunan's
expense.
42.
Hunan's waiver of any claim of RCC not performing all of the
Landlord's Work as required under the Lease was reinforced when Hunan took
possession of the Premises in September. Under the terms of the Lease, Hunan's
taking possession and then beginning to do its own work is to be considered
conclusive evidence that Hunan accepted the Premises as being in the condition
called for in the Lease.
43.
Finally, on October 29, 2004, Hunan specified in writing that
Landlord's Work was complete except for four things that RCC agreed to do, as
specified in the Lease Modification. Hunan specifically accepted the Premises
as-is.
44.
In consideration of what was to be a full and final resolution of
any claim on this issue, RCC agreed to waive the outstanding October rent of
$9,540.80 and alter the Rent Commencement date from October 1, 2004, to
November 1, 2004, although the Lease Commencement Date did not change.
45.
Hunan waived its claims that RCC did not complete the
Landlord's Work relating to restroom, electrical work, HVAC, water heater, Tbar ceiling, underground plumbing and flooring and cannot recover under its
counterclaim.
R. 372-73.
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The district court properly looked at the totality of the circumstances and the totality
of the evidence presented, and reached the proper conclusion that Appellants waived all
elements of their counterclaim. There is nothing inequitable about this conclusion. The
district court did not enter any finding of fact that RCC somehow had unclean hands and was
not deserving of the remedy of waiver. Rather, the findings are supported by copious
evidence, and support the district court's conclusions that RCC acted in good faith. RCC
relied on its general contractor and could have required its general contractor to perform any
work that was determined to be less than what the lease called for. Hunan had the Premises
inspected by its contractor within the first week of July, yet never submitted any punchlist
or gave any indication that it thought RCC needed to do more work. Appellants cannot later
claim at trial that Hunan's contractor should be paid by RCC for some of the work its
contractor performed when Hunan never gave RCC notice of it, never gave RCC the
opportunity to do the work, and then expressly claimed all Landlord's Work was completed.
Therefore, the district court should be affirmed.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS' REQUEST TO
AMEND THE COUNTERCLAIM
Appellants next argue that the district court erred by denying their request to amend

their Counterclaim. Under these circumstances, it was a proper exercise of the district
court's discretion to deny the Motion to Amend. The standard of review is to determine
whether the district court abused its discretion. See Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty
West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1278, 1281 (Utah 1998) (stating that the Court "will affirm the
denial unless the trial court abused its discretion").
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Appellants did not state any specific grounds for the Motion to Amend, but simply
stated that it was consistent with the scheduling order. The mere fact that the Scheduling
Order (R. 136-138) permits a party to make a motion to amend its pleadings is not, alone,
sufficient grounds for allowing a such party to amend. Appellants were required to comply
with the requirements of Rules 7 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which they did
not do in this case.
Rule 7 requires a moving party to state with "particularity" the "grounds for their relief
sought." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). In Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,1(58; 48 P.3d
895, the Utah Supreme Court explained why setting forth the grounds is important:
Specifically, Rule 7(b)(1) requires the grounds for a motion for leave to amend
to be stated particularly and with an attached proposed amended pleading so that
the court can ascertain what changes are sought and can determine whether the
motion should be granted and whether justice so requires the amendment of a
pleading.
The Court went on to affirm the lower court's decision to not allow amendment, stating:
Further, Holmes's request failed to "state with particularity the grounds" upon
which it based its motion for leave to amend. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). Holmes
merely cited rule 15(a) and noted that leave to amend should be freely given.
Holmes never articulated a single reason why the trial court should have
granted it leave to amend . . . .
Id. at ^[59 (emphasis added).
In their Motion to Amend,1 Appellants failed to set forth, with particularity, a single
reason why the Motion to Amend should have been granted. Just as the litigant in Holmes

1

No supporting memorandum was filed with the Motion to Amend, and the Motion to
Amend itself contained just two sentences in stating why the Motion to Amend should be
granted: consistent with the Scheduling Order and Rule 15(a) URCP; and that justice so
requires. (R.156)
857984vl

-39-

merely cited the rule, Hunan merely stated a legal conclusion that "justice so requires" an
amendment to the pleadings, without articulating a single reason to support the conclusion.
The Holmes court set forth three required elements to a motion to amend: (1) bringing a
separate identifiable motion; (2) setting forth with particularity grounds for the relief sought;
and (3) attaching the proposed amended pleading. A failure in any one of these elements is
fatal to the request to amend. In the case at hand, Appellants failed to set forth the grounds
for relief, and it was proper for the district court to deny the Motion to Amend.
Appellants now challenge the district court's ruling by relying on many unverified
allegations that are not supported by the Findings. Appellants have not challenged the
Findings. Therefore, such spurious allegations should be ignored. In addition to relying on
unverified allegations, Appellants ignore the procedural setting of the Motion to Amend. By
August 12, 2005, RCC had filed its opposition to the Motion to Amend. At this point, the
parties still had until September 30,2005, to complete discovery. (R.137). After letting the
Motion to Amend sit for five months, on January 17,2006, Appellants finally filed a request
to submit the Motion to Amend to the district court for decision. (R. 182). On December 8,
2005, approximately six weeks earlier, the district court had already conducted its final
pretrial conference and set a trial date. Appellants did not raise this issue to the district court
at the time of the final pretrial conference. In fact, neither Appellants nor their counsel even
attended the pretrial conference. Given this procedural posture (the case was about to go to
trial), and given the five-month delay in submitting the matter to the court for decision, the
district court had every reason to deny the Motion to Amend.
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Contrary to Appellants' very short description of why the district court denied the
Motion to Amend, the district court enumerated seven different reasons supporting its
conclusion that the Motion to Amend should be denied, including the following:
1.

Appellants did not, with particularity, provide grounds for the relief
sought;

2.

Appellants had not conducted any discovery to show any new facts or
evidence that would require an amendment;

3.

Appellants waited approximately six weeks after the pretrial conference
to submit the motion for decision by the district court;

4.

At oral argument, Appellants did not provide any reason for the delay in
bringing their Motion to Amend to the district court for ruling, but argued
that it should be treated as a motion to amend to conform to the evidence
at trial, which is an improper analysis;

5.

That allegations Appellants tried to admit as fact at oral argument were
not supported by affidavit;

6.

That the claims Appellants proposed amended complaint were not based
on newly discovered facts brought out by Appellants discovery, as
Appellants did not conduct any discovery in the case; and

7.

That because of the delay in bringing it to the court for decision, it should
not be considered timely filed.

(R.255-258). On appeal, Appellants address only the last of those reasons—whether the
Motion to Amend should be considered timely filed—and, accordingly, fail to show how the
district court abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Amend.
VI.

CROSS-APPEAL: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED RCC'S
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
The Lease specifically provides that the prevailing party is entitled to recover its

reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses in any dispute. Utah's unlawful detainer
statute in effect at the time of trial mandates that attorneys' fees be included in the judgment,
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stating "[t]he judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times
the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for
reasonable attorneys9 fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement/' Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-811 (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3)) (emphasis added).2
The Utah Code in effect at the time of trial mandated that the judgment include an award of
attorneys' fees if attorneys' fees are provided for in the lease. Because the Lease in this case
provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees, the district court was required to enter such an
award in addition to any other damages, including treble damages.
However, even without the unique attributes regarding the award of attorneys' fees as
bestowed by the unlawful detainer statute, Utah case law requires an award of attorneys' fees
when they are provided for in the underlying contract. In Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court relied on several Utah cases to conclude that, when fees are
allowed by contract, then they must be awarded as matter of legal right. This holding was
after an analysis of whether a district court, in the face of a contract requiring an award of
fees, "can exercise its discretion to make no award of fees." Id. at 836. The Cobabe decision
was later followed in Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Saunders
court agreed that attorneys' fees, when provided for by contract, should be awarded as a
matter of legal right and stated that "if reasonable fees are recoverable by statute or contract,
it is a mistake of law to award less than that amount." Id. at 579 (emphasis added).

2

This section was amended in 2007 to remove the requirement that attorneys' fees be
provided for in the lease in order to be awarded in the judgment, and to expand the scope of
damages which could be trebled.
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The district court was, at first, silent in its findings and conclusions regarding any
reason to not award attorneys' fees to RCC, which would be reversible error. See Findings,
at 36 % 51; see also Myrah v. Campbell, 2007 UT App 168, ^[36. RCC pointed this out in its
memoranda supporting its Rule 52 Motion to Amend. In response, the district court, in
denying RCC's Rule 52 Motion to Amend, relied on A.K. & R Whipple Plumbing and
Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, %\2, 47 P.3d 92, which states that "courts have, in
extraordinary situations, declined to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in spite of an
enforceable contractual provision." A copy of the district court's "Order Denying Plaintiffs
Rule 52 Motion to Amend" is included behind Tab 2 in the Addendum to this brief.
In relying on Whipple, the district court determined that the case at hand was
"extraordinary," in that: (i) RCC "has been awarded a substantial judgment, including treble
damages, and a further award is not merited under the facts of this case"; (ii) Appellants were
"legally barred from recovering on their tenant improvements" claims; and, (iii) Appellants
"raised a number of real and substantial issues that the Court considered carefully in its
ruling." (R. 402).
These reasons do not rise to the level of the "extraordinary" circumstances
contemplated under Utah law. There is nothing extraordinary about a party raising
substantial issues at trial that cause careful consideration prior to having a court rule against
such arguments. Nor is it extraordinary that a landlord could be entitled to a significant
judgment when treble damages are included. The issue of extraordinary circumstances was
reviewed in one of the footnotes in Cobabe. The Cobabe court noted that, in two non-Utah
cases, courts had determined that refusing generous settlement offers in one case and
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improper actions by both parties in the other case could result in a refusal to award attorney
fees. Cobabe, 780 P.2dat 836 fn. 3. Neither of these reasons is present here.
The Cobabe court referred to one Utah case, Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah
1976), as showing when attorneys' fees could be refused for "extraordinary" circumstances.
In Fullmer, the plaintiff did not prevail on one of its primary claims. Specifically, the
Fullmer court first noted that "it is significant that the trial courtfound against the plaintiffs'
contention on one of the main issues in holding that the assignment to defendant [] was not
fraudulent, but was bona fide." Id. at 610 (emphasis added). That this circumstance of not
prevailing on a main issue is considered to be extraordinary is highlighted in a later case,
stating "where particular complicated circumstances of the suit which involved principles of
equity, as well as the fact that on a main issue the court had found against the party
seeking attorney's fees, both entered in the court's denial of an attorney's fee." Jenkins
v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added).
In the case at hand, the district court ruled in favor of RCC on each and every one of
RCC's claims and positions. Furthermore, the district court rejected every one of Appellants'
claims and defenses as well. In its ruling, the district court did not find any improper conduct
by RCC, or that it refused any generous settlement offers. The district court's only reasons
were that RCC's award was already large enough and that it was a tough case to decide
because of the substantial issues raised.
Although there may be extraordinary circumstances where a court might, as a matter
of law, be permitted to rewrite the contract between the parties and disregard the clause
regarding the award of attorney's fees, such situations are highly unusual. The case at hand
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does not present such a situation. Therefore, the Court should reverse the district court's
denial of RCC's Rule 52 Motion to Amend and remand for a determination of RCC's
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, including those incurred on appeal. See Cobabe, 780
P.2d at 837 (an award of attorneys' fees includes appeals).
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's findings and conclusions should
be affirmed in their entirety, with one exception: the district court's decision to deny RCC
recovery of its attorneys' fees should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this jH

day of September, 2008.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Bv: R q ^ f e c A t?H$
Jntf Russell S/Mitchell
v Attorneys for Fjlaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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Tabl

(3/10/2005 14:39 FAX 8183467400

-> PROMENADE

©001

AGREEMENT REGARDING RENT COMMENCEMENT DATE AND
LANDLORD WORK UNDER LEASE DATED OCTOBER 22ND,2003
RED CLIFFS CORNER, LLC, A Utah limited LiabiKty Craipany ("LaIldlo^l,,),
and J J HUNAN, INC., a Utah Coiporation, dba J J Hunan Sum Fun Food
('Tenant"), in consideration of the mutual promises set forth herein, the sufficiency of
which is hereby acknowledged, hereby agree that the Lease Agreement ("Lease")
dated October 22*, 20<B, executed on November 21*, 2003, by Tenant, and executed
November 26*, 2003 > by Landlord, be modified as to the Commencement Date and
Landlord's Wo* as follows:
L The Commencement Date under the Lease regarding when rent shall
commence shall be modified from October 1*, 2004,toNovember 1*, 2004.
Z Tenant agrees that the only remaining Landlord's Work is as follows:
ab.
c
d.

Modify HVAC unitstoprovide 10tonHVAC;
Charge the HVAC andfillwith Freononce Tenant has power hooked up;
Repair small roof leak coming from duct w oik; and
Obtain acceptable response from Watts Construction regarding a cut
through the top {date.

3. Tenant agrees that, other than the items iu paragraph 2 above, all of the
Landlord's Work is completed, and Tenant accepts die Premises as is and
waives any and all claims for further Landlord's Weak under the Lease*
This agreement is entered into as of this 29* day of October, 2004.
TENANT:

LANDLORD:

JJ HUNAN, Inc.
A Utah Corporation,
dba JJ HUNAN SUM]

RED CLIFFS CORNER, LLC
A Utah limited liability Company
by DAYSTAR DEVELOPMENT, INC,
its Managing 1
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2007 JUL I 7 AM 5" 08

RED CLIFFS CORNER, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability company,
I
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 52 MOTION TO AMEND

J

J.J. HUNAN, INC., a Utah corporation,
dba J.J. HUNAN SUM FUN FOOD,
and R. ALAN KNOX, an individual,

Case No. 050500538
Judge Eric A. Ludlow

Defendants.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs Rule 52 Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Plaintiff requests its attorneys fees; the Court previously ordered the parties
to bear their own fees and costs. Defendant opposes the motion and has asked for relief on other
matters. Having considered the motion and the memoranda submitted by both parties, the Court
denies the motion.
Plaintiff has been awarded a substantial judgment, including treble damages, and a further
award is not merited under the facts of this case. Moreover, while the Court ultimately found
defendants were legally barred from recovering on their tenant improvements, defendants raised
a number of real and substantial issues that the Court considered carefully in its ruling. As the
Court of Appeals has noted,"courts have, in extraordinary situations, declined to award attorney
fees to a prevailing party in spite of an enforceable contractual provision." A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, % 12 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted).

U.M

i

Accordingly, the Court declines to award attorney's fees at this time.
The Court has not seen the proposed judgment at this time and so does not here rule on
defendants' objections to plaintiffs proposal.
Dated this

day of July, 2007.

BY THECOURT:

JUDGE ERIC A. LUDLOW
Fifth District Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

_ day of July, 2007,1 caused to be mailed, postage

prepaid, and/or caused to be delivered via folder in the Clerk's Office of the Fifth District Court,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
to:

Russell S. Mitchell, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, P.C.
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A
St. George, Utah 84770-3041
Russell S. Walker, Esq.
David R. Williams, Esq.
Woodbury & Kesler, P.C.
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358

Clerk, Fifth District Cou
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